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Introduction 
The term ‘collective bargaining’ was first used in 1891 by Beatrice Webb, an economic 
theorist and one of the founders of the industrial relations field in the UK. She and her partner 
Sidney Webb described collective bargaining as a process through which workers come 
together and send representatives to negotiate over their terms and conditions of 
employment. It was seen as a collective alternative to individual bargaining - or ‘one of the 
methods used by trade unions to further their basic purpose “of maintaining or improving the 
conditions of their [members’] working lives’” (Webb and Webb 1920: 1, cited in Flanders 1968: 
1-2). 
The Webbs’ definition emphasizes the importance of collective action on the part of 
workers in establishing and negotiating formal agreements. Other scholars have defined 
collective bargaining more broadly as a process of negotiation, joint decision-making, or joint 
regulation between groups who represent both employer and employee interests; and which 
implies the ‘negotiation and continuous application of an agreed set of rules to govern the 
substantive and procedural terms of the employment relationship’ (Windmuller et al. 1987, 
cited in Traxler 1994: 168). It is distinct from consultation or joint problem-solving, in that it 
results in formal, bargained agreements or contracts to which both parties are obliged to 
adhere during an agreed upon period. 
Collective bargaining can be viewed as the most developed form of representative or 
collective voice, as it is typically carried out within a framework of rules, procedures, and rights 
set out in national and international law. It can involve the different actors discussed in other 
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chapters in this volume: the state, trade unions, works councils, employers, middle managers, 
and employees. However, the role played by each of these actors in the bargaining system 
varies considerably across countries, depending on the bargaining structure and rights accorded 
to them through law and practice. 
Scholarship on collective bargaining has examined its impact on a range of outcomes for 
firms, workers, economies, and societies. Collective bargaining can involve partnership and can 
be complementary to direct forms of voice, such as individual or team-based worker 
involvement. This kind of integrative or ‘mutual gains’ bargaining can reduce shop-floor conflict, 
promoting trust, facilitating restructuring, and reducing employee turnover. At the national 
level, organized or coordinated collective bargaining models typical of northern and central 
Europe have been associated with reduced strike rates, high productivity, and wage 
moderation. Collective bargaining also plays an important role in shaping distributional 
outcomes within firms and societies. Collective agreements and collective bargaining 
institutions affect how productivity gains and risks are allocated between different stakeholder 
groups. For this reason, collective bargaining is often characterized by conflict. Employers and 
unions engage in ‘zero-sum’ or distributive bargaining on many issues and use strikes, pickets, 
and lock-outs as common means to demonstrate or exercise countervailing power. 
The distinctiveness of collective bargaining lies in this role as an institution that involves 
formal negotiations between two organizations representing employer and worker interests, 
and holding different forms of political and economic power. As unions and bargaining 
institutions have come under pressure in the last twenty years, a debate has arisen over 
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whether bargaining remains a viable form of voice - if it is perhaps being replaced by human 
resource management, direct participation, and government regulation through individual 
employment rights. How researchers interpret the causes of these changes and their 
implications for workers and society varies according to the emphasis they place on the 
integrative or distributive aspects of the bargaining system. 
In this chapter, we first present an overview of different forms of collective bargaining, 
looking at how institutions and models differ across countries. This is the basis for a review of 
research examining the integrative or efficiency-enhancing role of collective bargaining - which 
typically emphasizes strategic choice and mutual gains, and studies focusing on the 
distributional consequences of these institutions - which place more emphasis on the role of 
power and conflict in shaping bargaining processes and outcomes. We argue that research 
focusing on performance outcomes provides a useful but incomplete set of tools to analyze the 
form and consequences of collective bargaining institutions. These institutions have historically 
played a central role in redistributing political and economic power within workplaces, 
industries, and societies. Attention to contemporary changes in labor power can help to explain 
why and how this distinctive form of employee voice has been weakened within different 
national contexts. 
 
Collective Bargaining Forms and Structures 
Collective bargaining institutions vary across countries as a result of differences in the 
legal framework, as well as the distinctive traditions and organizational structure of employers 
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and labor unions. One important institutional difference is whether governments protect 
employees’ right to join unions and to engage in industrial action, or instead intervene to 
obstruct collective bargaining. Although the right to collective bargaining is a core labor 
standard as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO), workers continue to lack 
these basic rights in many countries (ILO 2008).1 The International Trade Union Confederation 
(2012) reports that in 2011 at least 76 workers were murdered worldwide as a direct result of 
union activities, while repressions of strike action and organizing activities resulted in a 
reported 3508 arrests and 15 860 dismissals. 
In countries with developed industrial relations institutions, collective bargaining can 
take different forms. In ‘single-employer bargaining’, individual employers negotiate 
agreements at the company or workplace level with labor unions or other worker 
representatives with legal rights, such as works councils. In ‘multi-employer bargaining’, one or 
more unions or union confederations negotiate agreements with one or more employers’ 
associations (Jackson 2005). These agreements can cover the workforce in a particular industry 
or occupation; or can cover a range of sectors at the national level - often with the involvement 
of government agencies through ‘tripartite’ arrangements. 
Countries also differ in the degree of bargaining centralization. ‘Centralized bargaining’ 
implies that national or industry agreements are the dominant form for regulating terms and 
conditions of employment; while ‘decentralized bargaining’ implies that company or 
establishment-level agreements predominate.2 Bargaining often takes place at multiple levels. 
In many European countries, multi-employer collective bargaining between employers’ 
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associations and labor unions establishes minimum wage levels or overall wage increases at the 
industry or national level; but individual employers negotiate supplementary agreements with 
unions and/or works councils at the company and establishment levels. For example, in Sweden 
wage increases are agreed centrally, but are distributed at the local level based on company-
level negotiations, allowing substantial pay individualization. 
Countries with multi-level bargaining systems further differ in the degree of 
coordination between levels. Bargaining coordination can be defined as the extent to which 
‘minor players’ (such as managers or union representatives at the company level) follow or 
adhere to agreements reached by ‘major players’ (such as peak associations) (Soskice 1990; Hall 
and Gingerich 2004). There are different ways to achieve coordination in wage bargaining: 
through direct means, as an explicit goal of peak business and labor associations or through 
state intervention; or through more informal means, such as pattern agreements led by 
bargaining agents at large firms or in leading industries. Countries with company or 
establishment-level bargaining, such as the USA and Canada, are typically viewed as* having 
uncoordinated systems. Informal coordination is common in countries with sectoral bargaining 
systems, such as Germany, in which peak associations are weaker and employer associations at 
the industry level negotiate agreements with industry-based unions. Coordination in this case 
relies on strong and relatively encompassing associations that are able to exert control over 
their members. Overt or direct coordination takes different forms. For example, in Belgium 
economy-wide agreements are negotiated between the main employer and union 
confederations at the national level, which then establish a framework for negotiations at 
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industry and cross-industry levels. In other countries, such as Spain and Portugal, national 
accords between peak associations and the government have been important at different 
periods in standardizing wage increases and ensuring member organizations do not deviate 
from those agreements. In Japan, the main union confederations set minimum objectives for 
the annual spring bargaining round, and unions adjust their company-level demands based on 
negotiation outcomes in the biggest companies. 
Most countries have experienced change over time in dominant collective bargaining 
levels, as well as in the degree of coordination between levels. In general, there has been a 
trend toward increased company or establishment-level bargaining, even where sectoral 
agreements remain dominant (Katz 1993; OECD 2012: 139-42). Sweden exemplifies this trend: 
it had a centralized and coordinated bargaining system, but following an employer offensive in 
the 1990s, it moved to sectoral and company bargaining with weaker coordination (Swenson 
and Pontusson 2000). At the same time, other countries have experienced a shift toward 
increased bargaining centralization and coordination. In Italy, union confederations became 
involved in tripartite negotiations in the 1990s through social pacts aimed at controlling wage 
inflation (Baccaro 2002). 
These patterns are shaped in part by the history, traditions, and strategies of major 
actors. However, they are also strongly influenced by the legal framework within which 
collective bargaining takes place. Faws establish union recognition procedures, rights  to strike, 
and rights to engage in secondary boycotts; as well as what actions constitute ‘unfair’ or illegal 
practices by employers, such as their rights to lock out striking workers or dismiss workers for 
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participating in union activities. Even among the OECD and EU member states, 24 percent of 
countries are reported to have minor or major restrictions on collective bargaining rights in the 
market sector, while 44 percent have restrictions on the right to strike (Visser 2011). Labor laws 
and policies can make a substantial difference to union power and strategies. For example, 
sympathy strikes or secondary boycotts are typically illegal, but continue to be a viable tool of 
industrial action in Nordic countries - which unions have used to maintain bargaining coverage 
in industries characterized by a high degree of subcontracting, such as construction (Lillie and 
Greer 2007). 
Participation rights, which define those areas in which workers have a right to negotiate 
collective agreements and participate in management decision-making, also vary across 
countries. One difference concerns the bargaining subjects on which employers are legally 
required to negotiate or come to agreement with worker representatives. In the USA, if a union 
has been certified as a bargaining partner, employers are required to bargain ‘in good faith’ 
over certain ‘mandatory’ subjects, defined as wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment. However, they are not required to discuss other subjects defined as ‘permissive’, 
including reorganization decisions or evaluation criteria. In Germany, works councils hold 
strong ‘co-determination rights’, which give them not only the right to negotiate but also 
effective veto power over a wider range of decisions concerning, for example, the design of 
variable pay or the use of monitoring (See Chapter 15 on works councils). Countries may also 
have different forms of board- level participation rights, which require large companies to 
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include worker representatives in consultation or decision-making bodies, such as supervisory 
boards. 
Another area in which the legal framework differs across countries concerns the 
mandatory extension of collective agreements through public law. This can be important for 
ensuring broad application of bargaining agreements to more poorly organized firms or 
economic sectors. Table 14.1 lists those OECD countries that have widely available and regularly 
applied legal provisions for mandatory extension of agreements; those with provisions that are 
available but not widely used; and those where extension provisions are not available.  
These legal provisions take different forms. In some countries, such as Germany, legal  
Insert Table 14.1 Here 
 
extension of agreements is dependent on the bargaining parties covering a certain percentage 
of the workforce in a particular industry or occupation, and typically requires both parties to 
request an extension. In other countries, such as France, the government directly intervenes to 
declare agreements generally binding to all firms in the relevant sector and/or region. In 
Austria, membership in employers’ associations is mandatory, and all members are required to 
apply the relevant collective agreement. There are alternatives to legal extension by the state 
that can also ensure broad adherence to collective agreements. In Denmark, high union density 
and social pressure traditionally have ensured that a majority of firms follow agreements. 
Institutions providing for legal extension are strongly influenced by government policy, and can 
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thus change rapidly. In Australia, a conservative government passed major labor law reform in 
2005, eliminating a system of national arbitration that had allowed pay and conditions 
negotiated in unionized workplaces to be applied across the workforce. These reforms were 
only partially reversed in 2009 under a Labor government. 
The different bargaining arrangements and legal frameworks discussed above have an 
impact on bargaining coverage (the proportion of the workforce covered by collective 
agreements) as well as on union density (the proportion of the workforce who are union 
members). Figures 14.1 and 14.2 illustrate the variation in both measures across OECD 
countries. 
For the OECD as a whole, over 60 percent of the workforce is covered by collective 
agreements. Coverage is over 70 percent in most of Western Europe - with over 90 percent 
coverage in Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, and France. Union density rates are significantly 
lower in most countries, and are not always correlated with bargaining coverage. A comparison 
of bargaining coverage and union density shows three patterns. One group of countries has 
high bargaining coverage and high union density. Most of these are Nordic (for example, 
Finland, Denmark, and Sweden). They typically rely on high union membership rates to secure 
high coverage and bargaining power, and have other institutions, such as union involvement in 
social insurance provision, that provide additional incentives for membership. A second group 
of countries has low union membership density and low bargaining coverage, including the 
Anglo-American countries, most of central and eastern Europe, Japan, and Mexico. In these 
countries, bargaining is relatively decentralized and there are no or weak legal provisions for 
  Handbook of research on employee 
voice 11 
 
extension of agreements. A third group of countries has high bargaining coverage and low 
union membership rates. This group includes, among others, Austria, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. France is the most extreme example, with 7.6 percent union density and 90 
percent bargaining coverage. This pattern is most common where there are strong legal 
provisions for extension of agreements, but weaker or more fragmented union presence at 
company and establishment level. 
Figures 14.1 and 14.2 also show that both bargaining coverage and trade union density 
have declined in most OECD countries over the past two decades. Between 1990 and 2011, 
coverage fell most dramatically in countries that experienced major changes to labor laws 
affecting recognition and extension procedures, including Australia and New Zealand, and to a 
lesser extent the UK and Portugal. However, it is also notable that coverage has remained 
stable or increased in many countries, including most of the Nordic countries, Belgium, Austria, 
Spain, and the Netherlands. In contrast, union density has decreased - although by varying 
degrees - in most OECD countries. 
Insert Figure 14.1 Here 
 
Insert Figure 14.2 Here 
 
These comparative statistics demonstrate the continued importance of collective 
bargaining institutions in determining wages and working conditions. They also provide further 
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evidence of the large variation in the structure of and changes in these institutions. In the 
following sections, we review the literature on outcomes from these different institutional 
configurations, and discuss the implications for the future of collective bargaining. 
 
Economic and Social Effects of Collective Bargaining 
Neoclassical economic models are typically the starting point for debates concerning the 
economic and social effects of collective bargaining. According to these models, efficient or 
‘equilibrium’ wage and employment levels are derived from variation in the supply of and 
demand for labor in perfect markets. Collective bargaining institutions are theorized to 
introduce inefficiencies into labor markets, as unions create ‘cartels’ and force firms to employ 
labor at above market rates. In the long run, firms with these institutions should only be able to 
compete when they are themselves in a monopoly position, allowing them to share their 
monopoly rents with unions. Alternatively, employers may seek to create their own cartel 
arrangements by joining employers’ associations and bargaining at industry level to take wages 
out of competition. Where they are not able to exercise monopoly power, firms may seek to 
remain competitive through introducing labor-saving technology - although unions often resist 
these changes. All of these alternatives are viewed as efficiency-destroying, through driving up 
labor costs and restricting employment growth. 
According to the insider-outsider framework, unions also exacerbate inequality through 
seeking to advance the immediate interests of ‘labor market insiders’ at the expense of 
‘outsider’ groups such as women, young people, and immigrants, or workers in more poorly 
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organized sectors and workplaces. Collective agreements are thus argued to secure a wage 
premium and job security for union members, while creating negative externalities in regard to 
lower levels of overall employment, unequal wage distribution, and higher job insecurity for 
non-members (Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Rueda 2007). Friedrich Hayek famously observed 
along these lines that British unions were ‘the biggest obstacle to raising the living standards of 
the working class ... The chief cause of the unnecessarily big differences between the best and 
worst-paid workers... the prime source of unemployment... and the main reason for the decline 
of the British economy in general’ (Hayek 1984: 52).4 Following from these arguments, 
neoclassical theorists often conclude that the state has the obligation to curb union power in 
order to promote society’s welfare, both in terms of economic growth and equity. Their ideas 
influenced the labor market policies and labor law reforms of Ronald Reagan in the USA and 
Margaret Thatcher in the UK in the 1980s, and have become dominant in microeconomic 
models estimating the impact of collective bargaining institutions on wage and employment 
levels. 
Neoclassical models of the labor market described above have been criticized on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Some of the most influential criticism derives from the 
institutional economists who founded the industrial relations discipline in the USA and UK, 
including Commons (1934) and the Webbs (1920). These scholars argued that labor markets 
were both imperfect and different from other factor markets, and thus to understand their 
operation it was necessary to analyze the wider legal, political, social, and economic relations in 
which they were embedded. On the economic side, unions were shown to have more 
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ambiguous effects on efficient wage and employment levels. Labor markets were not fully 
competitive, due to the monopsony power of large firms, and the difficulty of specifying labor 
contracts and overseeing labor effort meant that assumptions of zero transaction costs and 
complete contracts could not be applied. 
The institutional economists also outlined a broader series of arguments for the positive 
social or distributional role of collective bargaining. Underlying this was an ethical concern that 
labor should be treated differently from other factor inputs, as it was embodied in human 
beings and thus subject to ‘uniquely human concerns and considerations’ (Kaufman 2007: 11). 
Commons observes that in neoclassical theory, workers are treated ‘as commodities to be 
bought and sold according to demand and supply’ while in the institutional perspective ‘they 
are treated as citizens with rights against others on account of their value to the nation as a 
whole’ (cited in Kaufman 2007: 19). One substantial obstacle to the exercise of citizenship rights 
was employers’ disproportionate power to unilaterally determine terms and conditions of 
employment. Legislation and collective bargaining were thus needed to correct not only market 
imperfections, but also to remedy the unequal balance of power in the employment 
relationship by redistributing and redefining property rights. 
These two concerns of the early institutional economists - with labor unions’ role in 
enhancing economic performance and improving equity in the distribution of power and 
resources in a society - have continued to be central in scholarship on outcomes from 
alternative collective bargaining arrangements. We review this literature below. 
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Collective Bargaining and Economic Performance 
One stream of research on outcomes from collective bargaining has focused on its 
contribution to efficiency, productivity, and macroeconomic performance. 
There are several ways in which firms can benefit from collective bargaining institutions. 
At the establishment, company, or industry level, collective bargaining can enhance social 
peace, helping to reduce conflict through providing a formal structure for labor-management 
cooperation. Strikes have been found to be less frequent in countries with high union density 
and a centralized and unified labor movement as unions can more effectively push their 
demands with employers and the government in the institutional arenas (Korpi and Shalev 
1979; Lehmbruch 1984). Collective agreements can help to correct inefficiencies associated 
with information asymmetries, underinvestment in human capital, and arbitrary management. 
They can be a means for establishing transparent administrative rules and procedures, such as 
internal labor markets, which can encourage firm-specific investments in training and reduce 
employee turnover (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Osterman and Burton 2006). Collective 
bargaining also provides workers with the opportunity to exercise ‘collective voice’ in decisions 
concerning work organization or pay-setting (Freeman and Medoff 1984). This can reduce hiring 
and training costs associated with quits (Doellgast 2008) and provide worker input on changes 
in production that may stimulate increased efficiency (Addison et al. 2001; Huebler and Jirjahn 
2003).  
A large body of research has examined the role of collective bargaining institutions in 
facilitating productivity-enhancing work reorganization. One group of studies in the USA and UK 
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has focused on union participation in implementing ‘high involvement’ or ‘high performance’ 
work systems (see Chapter 6). Case studies of firms such as Saturn (Rubinstein 2000) and Kaiser 
Permanente (Kochan, Eaton et al. 2009), as well as reviews of partnership initiatives (for 
example, Kochan and Osterman 1994; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Bamber et al. 2009), have shown 
that union involvement in work reorganization can help to enhance trust and lead to ‘mutual 
gains’ in terms of improved working conditions and increased productivity. However, these 
outcomes depend on the organizational strength and strategy of unions. Comparative studies 
have found that labor-management cooperation over restructuring is more widespread (Turner 
1991) and more often associated with productivity improvements (Addison et al. 2000; Zwick 
2004) in countries with high bargaining coverage and strong participation rights. One argument 
holds that because unions in these settings enjoy institutional security, they are more willing to 
cooperate with measures to introduce new technology or efficiency-enhancing work 
reorganization strategies (Katz and Sabel 1985). Managers are also more likely to cooperate 
with worker representatives where they have less opportunity and incentive to exit costly 
agreements (Doellgast 2012). These institutions thus put ‘productive constraints’ on firms 
through encouraging the adoption of measures that improve organizational performance while 
ensuring that gains from these improvements are more equitably shared with workers (Dore 
1973; Streeck 1996). 
Multi-employer bargaining has also been found to benefit firms through improving 
predictability and overcoming market failures. Sectoral agreements can take wages out of 
competition, reducing incentives for poaching. Studies have found a lower union wage 
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premium in those countries with more centralized bargaining systems (Blau and Kahn 1999). 
Alternatively, a high-wage policy by unions at the national level may be used to encourage firms 
to invest in productivity improvements or to trigger a shift of labor to higher productivity firms 
and sectors. This was an explicit goal, for example, of the solidaristic wage policies pursued by 
Scandinavian unions in the 1980s, following the Rehn-Meidner model (Meidner and Rehn 
1953). Industry-level bargaining systems can also encourage collective solutions to problems 
such as underinvestment in occupational skills and support inter-firm cooperation in R&D 
(Iversen and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003: 87). The resulting higher levels of skills in an economy 
and the improved capacity of firms to use these skills are believed to promote industrial 
upgrading and innovation. 
Centralized or tripartite bargaining arrangements have been widely studied to assess 
the distinctive advantages they provide for firms and national economies. Neo- corporatist 
theories argued that tripartite bargaining encouraged the division of productivity gains 
between the social partners and promoted wage restraint (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). 
More recently, the literature on ‘social pacts’ has examined the conditions under which unions 
overcome past conflicts to negotiate tripartite agreements aimed at supporting economic 
competitiveness and controlling inflation through wage moderation (Regini 2000; Rhodes 2001; 
Molina and Rhodes 2002). Research has shown that these pacts tend to emerge in situations of 
economic crisis or stress, weak governments, and intermediately centralized unions (Avdagic et 
al. 2011). 
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A comparison of responses to the 2008 financial crisis provides a contemporary example 
of how corporatist forms of collective bargaining continue to help employers and economies 
adjust to economic shocks (Glassner and Galgoczi 2009). In Germany, short-time working 
policies allowed companies to reduce working hours during the economic downturn without 
having to lay off employees - thus assuring retention of skilled labor. These policies were 
supported by unions and backed by direct subsidies at the national level, but were also 
negotiated as part of concessionary packages by unions and works councils at the sector and 
workplace levels (Dribbusch 2009). Another example is the success of the Danish economy in 
the 2000s, which has been attributed to a strong tradition of labor cooperation and to 
‘flexicurity’ policies that combined reduced employment protections with a high level of 
unemployment insurance and government investment in retraining (Madsen 2002). 
A number of quantitative studies have analyzed the relationship between bargaining 
structure and macroeconomic performance. Some scholars have examined the degree of 
bargaining centralization, testing the neo-corporatist thesis that more centralized systems are 
better able to control inflation and weather economic shocks. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
showed that macroeconomic performance was strongest in countries with either highly 
centralized systems characterized by national bargaining, such as the Nordic countries, where 
encompassing unions were more likely to support wage moderation, or highly decentralized 
systems, such as the USA, where unions had little power over wage structures. Others argued 
that the degree of bargaining coordination was a better measure for predicting wage 
moderation, as it accounts for the ability of central actors to control local pay-setting (Soskice 
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1990; Kenworthy 2003). Recent studies demonstrate that the performance of different 
bargaining structures is dependent on a range of factors, including monetary policy and central 
bank independence (Cukierman and Lippi 1999; Coricelli et al. 2006), productivity differentials 
between exposed and sheltered sectors (Traxler and Brandi 2011), the extent of economic 
stability or change (Aidt and Tzannatos 2008), and internal governance processes in trade union 
confederations (Baccaro and Simoni 2010). 
This large body of theory and research has demonstrated that collective bargaining can 
contribute to improving the productivity of individual firms or workplaces, and encourage 
economic competitiveness at the industry or national level. However, these studies also 
necessarily highlight the inefficiencies associated with collective bargaining institutions that lack 
certain structural or strategic characteristics. While in some countries these institutions 
promote wage moderation, in others they contribute to wage inflation. While unions may form 
‘productivity coalitions’ with management and contribute to joint problem solving, they can 
also obstruct restructuring measures aimed at reducing labor costs and generate additional 
costs associated with industrial action. 
In addition, while there is a large body of evidence establishing the positive macro- 
economic effects of certain configurations of collective bargaining institutions, studies seeking 
to establish the impact of collective bargaining on organizational performance report mixed 
findings. For example, a recent series of cross-national studies looking at multiple industries 
and multinational firms found significant national differences in the labor practices of 
establishments, but report only modest productivity effects of those differences (Freeman and 
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Shaw 2009). This suggests that while collective bargaining can play a productivity-enhancing or 
market-correcting role, a focus on these outcomes provides only a partial explanation for the 
form that these institutions take and justification for policies supporting labor’s organizing and 
bargaining rights. 
 
Collective Bargaining, Power, and Inequality 
Collective bargaining institutions have also been widely studied for their distributional 
effects. These include the distribution of economic gains from productivity improvements, the 
distribution of risks resulting from fluctuations in the business cycle, and the broader 
distribution of economic and political power within workplaces or in society. Researchers 
focusing on distributional outcomes typically start from the premise that collective bargaining 
involves correcting a basic power imbalance in the employment relationship through legal 
intervention and collective action, with the goal of improving workers’ access to enhanced 
industrial or workplace democracy. 
Of central concern in this literature are the ways in which institutions channel or subvert 
conflict within organizations and societies. One source of conflict concerns the degree of 
worker control over pay and working conditions. Labor market segmentation theorists argue 
that the structure of internal labor markets is the result of a struggle between employers and 
unions over the control of work - for example, over technologies and skill demarcations (Rubery 
1978; Grimshaw and Rubery 1998), and often serves as a successful strategy by employers to 
control or marginalize union control on the shop-floor (Stone 1974). Thus, while performance 
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may be improved under cooperative workplace initiatives, this is argued to be at the expense of 
worker power, associated with reduced job security, work intensification, and increased 
‘capture’ of gains from productivity improvements by management and owners (Parker and 
Slaughter 1988; Kelly 2004). 
Comparative research suggests that unions’ success in advancing worker interests in 
improved pay and working conditions depends on bargaining rights and structures. In most 
liberal or Anglo-American countries, collective bargaining is associated with a union wage 
premium and stronger job security for union members (Shaw et al. 1998; Cully et al. 1999) but 
has been found to have little effect on practices that affect direct worker control over working 
pace and methods, such as teamwork, discretion, and monitoring (Wood 1996; Doellgast et al. 
2009). 
Worker representatives have been found to have more influence over pay structures 
and work design in countries with stronger participation rights and more encompassing 
bargaining institutions. In northern and central Europe, where these institutions are strongest, 
unions have most successfully promoted models of work organization that incorporate high 
levels of worker control and discretion. The ‘quality of working life’ movements in the 1970s 
and 1980s are the best-known examples of these initiatives (Gustavsen et al. 1996). 
Comparative studies have found that Nordic countries have particularly high levels of worker 
control, with better opportunities for participation (Gallie, 2003), higher influence over work 
tasks (Gallie, 2009), higher worker autonomy (Esser and Olsen, 2012), more ‘learning-oriented’ 
forms of work organization (Gustavsen, 2007), and a stronger use of negotiated or cooperative 
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approaches to restructuring (Brandt et al., 2008) compared to other European countries. This 
has been attributed in part to union strength at the workplace and industry levels (Sorensen 
and Weinkopf 2009). 
Collective bargaining institutions may also influence which groups of workers have 
access to jobs with good pay and working conditions - including patterns of wage or income 
inequality, and availability of permanent and secure (non-contingent) employment. Research 
has shown that centralized bargaining institutions with broad coverage (Traxler and Brandi 
2011), high union density (Rueda and Pontusson 2000), and high minimum wage levels 
(Koeniger et al. 2006) are the factors most strongly associated with lower levels of pay 
dispersion. These institutions have also been found to positively affect the gender wage gap 
(Arulampalam et al. 2007), to reduce labor market segmentation or ‘dualization’, and to 
encourage the adoption of welfare policies serving the interests of marginal workforce groups 
(Thelen 2009; Bosch et al. 2010). 
Again, the Nordic countries most clearly typify this ideal of coordinated and inclusive 
bargaining. They also share a tradition of ‘solidaristic bargaining’, which relied on groups with 
stronger labor market power accepting reductions in wage demands, encouraging 
redistribution from more strongly organized segments of the economy or workforce to weaker 
segments (Erixon 2008: 51). This has resulted in relatively homogeneous wages and working 
conditions between standard and contingent workers, high replacement ratios (Aiginger 2008; 
Thelen 2009), and a high ‘labor share’, measured as the share of labor compensation, in terms 
of wages and benefits, in the national income (ILO 2010: 26). These institutions provide unions 
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with a framework that allows them to bargain and enforce agreements for a broad workforce 
domain, making it more difficult for employers to exit agreements or to employ workers on 
sub-standard terms through, for example, subcontracting and non-standard work arrangement 
(Doellgast et al. 2009; Bosch et al. 2010). 
The findings of these studies suggest that collective or representative voice through 
collective bargaining can improve worker outcomes across different dimensions: pay, job 
security, and control or discretion, as well as patterns of pay inequality and the distribution of 
risk. However, these relationships differ across countries and can change over time. In the next 
section, we examine how different research traditions have interpreted recent changes in 
bargaining institutions and outcomes associated with these changes. 
 
Explaining Changes in Collective Bargaining and its Effects 
As discussed above, union density and collective bargaining coverage have declined in 
most countries. Collective bargaining has become increasingly decentralized, with more 
bargaining taking place at the workplace and firm levels, and is increasingly ‘disorganized’, with 
less coordination between labor and employer representatives at different levels. These trends 
have been accompanied by a growth in inequality, expansion of low wage and insecure 
employment, and declining labor share within many advanced economies - particularly in 
continental or ‘social’ Europe. In OECD countries, the median labor share dropped from 66.1 
percent at the beginning of the 1990s to 61.7 percent in the late 2000s, while the income of the 
top 1 percent of earners increased by 20 percent over the same period (OECD 2012: 110). 
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Moreover, the concentration of capital income increased by 9 percent between 1995 and 2005. 
Those workforce groups who are in a weaker position in the labor market have been the most 
affected by these trends, such as low-skilled, women, migrant, and atypical workers 
(Appelbaum et al. 2010; Kalina and Weinkopf 2012). 
Theorists focusing on the role of collective bargaining institutions in enhancing 
productivity and efficiency have broadly interpreted the shrinking coverage of these institutions 
as the consequence of their declining economic returns - at least in certain segments of 
national economies. According to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework, firms in countries 
characterized by non-market forms of coordination between business, labor, and the state 
derived distinctive ‘comparative institutional advantages’ in global markets - allowing them to 
successfully compete in industries and market segments requiring high skill levels and long-
term investment strategies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancke et al. 2007).5 The coordinated 
economies of continental Europe thus experienced the (relative) resilience of strong unions and 
multi-employer arrangements in the 1980s and 1990s because these institutions 
complemented the business strategies of leading firms, while unions declined in ‘liberal market 
economies’ because collective bargaining conflicted with employer interests in labor market 
flexibility (Thelen 2001). 
Recent literature in this area has argued that strong collective bargaining institutions 
continue to support economic competitiveness in coordinated market economies, but their 
value is increasingly limited to core economic sectors, where a cross-class coalition between 
management and labor supports them. Meanwhile, deregulation has been allowed to occur in 
  Handbook of research on employee 
voice 25 
 
more peripheral sectors and workplaces, where employers stand to benefit more from low 
costs and labor market flexibility (Hopner 2007; Palier and Thelen 2010). 
An alternative approach to explaining national differences in collective bargaining 
institutions is derived from power resource theory. These theorists argue that structures and 
outcomes of labor market institutions are explained by variation in the power of labor relative 
to employers, mediated through the state (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984). 
Differences in unions’ access to ‘power resources’ - including their organizational strength, level 
of coordination, and participation rights - influence their ability to promote worker interests in 
redistribution and control over their work. 
This suggests that coordinated forms of collective bargaining are not primarily 
established and maintained by employers seeking to resolve their own coordination problems, 
but instead are the product of the conflict between societal attempts to regulate the market 
through collective institutions and employer attempts to pursue individual economic advantage 
through undermining or escaping those institutions (Streeck 2009: 4). Market 
internationalization and liberalization have allowed employers to exit collective agreements, 
while the increased threat of exit has made it more difficult for unions to negotiate strong 
agreements or resist concessions (Bosch et al. 2010). Cross-country differences in patterns of 
inequality and dualism are the result of the resilience of institutions like collective bargaining, 
which redistribute risk and bargaining power in some national contexts, as well as the strategies 
of civil society actors, unions, and policymakers to establish and maintain these institutions in 
the face of business pressure (Emmenegger et al. 2012). This suggests that unions are not 
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necessarily complicit in the growth of peripheral jobs: they may also seek to represent new 
groups of workers, developing and using different ‘power resources’ as their traditional sources 
of bargaining power decline. 
The difference between these two approaches can be illustrated by comparing 
alternative explanations for recent changes in German industrial relations. Germany has 
experienced a large decline in bargaining coverage, dropping from 72 percent in 1990 to 59 
percent in 2011. The proportion of workers in low-wage work also grew over the same period, 
from 14.4 percent in 1995 to 23.1 percent in 2010 - levels close to thoseTn the USA and UK (see 
Bosch et al. 2010: 36). This expanding group is made up of a disproportionate number of 
women and non-standard workers (Kalina and Weinkopf 2012). 
Scholars adopting the varieties of capitalism perspective have argued that these trendy 
are the result of a growing gap between the interests of different employer groups. 
Coordinated bargaining continues to support the competitive strategies of large manufacturing 
firms in Germany, and so has been relatively stable in these companies. According to this view, 
employer exit from collective agreements and wage concessions is occurring primarily in small 
firms and service sector industries - and the expansion of these kinds of activities helps to 
explain declining bargaining coverage and growing inequality (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 
2011). 
In contrast, scholars adopting a power resources perspective have argued that a 
substantial, structural shift in bargaining power provides a more compelling explanation for the 
magnitude of recent changes in bargaining structures and outcomes in Germany. Research 
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evidence suggests that large German employers have not on the whole cooperated with 
unions, but instead have demanded concessions from their own workforce while directly 
pursuing strategies that have increased inequality across their production chain. These 
strategies include shifting work to lower-cost, non-union subcontractors and hiring temporary 
workers at lower wages (Greer 2008a; Holst et al. 2009). They have been able to do this 
because unions’ traditional sources of institutionalized bargaining power have progressively 
weakened. Changing government policies have allowed companies to pay temporary workers 
lower wages, and employers’ associations and lead employers within those associations have 
been unable or unwilling to extend agreements to smaller firms. German unions have organized 
campaigns aimed at mobilizing members in poorly organized industries and workplaces, but 
have had limited success in reversing these trends (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Greer 2008b; 
Turner 2009). 
The above comparison further illustrates the limitations of analyses that seek to explain 
the existence of and contemporary changes in collective bargaining institutions based on their 
performance effects. Recent trends of ‘institutional erosion’ have been strongly shaped by a 
power shift in favor of management as a result of market internationalization and government-
led deregulation. Declining bargaining power, in turn, reduces unions’ capacity to pursue 
distributive goals within national economies. This suggests that policies aimed at reducing 
economic and social inequality require governments, unions, and civil society to develop 
innovative strategies that seek to redress the growing imbalance in bargaining power. 
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Conclusions and Further Research 
This chapter has reviewed the different forms that collective bargaining takes, national 
differences in these institutions, and their effects on organizational, economic, and societal 
outcomes. A key area of disagreement in the literature was shown to be how scholars 
conceptualize cross-national variation in collective bargaining and outcomes associated with 
these institutions. Researchers focusing on the performance effects of collective bargaining 
emphasize the advantages to firms and economies of cooperation between management and 
labor, and seek to explain the conditions under which cooperation is supported or enhanced. 
Those focusing on the distributional consequences of collective bargaining place more 
emphasis on diverging interests and on the role of power in the employment relationship. They 
view the bargaining power of labor unions as a key factor explaining differences in these 
institutions across countries, as well as their labor market effects. 
Research on the economic consequences of collective bargaining has shown that strong 
unions, high bargaining coverage, and organized or ‘coordinated’ bargaining institutions are 
often resources for employers and their associations, rather than simply obstacles to 
implementing efficient or rational strategic choices. More generally, collective bargaining can 
help to resolve class conflict or channel it in more socially efficient and productive ways. 
However, analyses sensitive to distributional outcomes have provided distinctive insights into 
contemporary changes in collective bargaining institutions and their labor market effects. These 
scholars have shown that the declining power of labor relative to business interests has 
contributed to the erosion of coordinated collective bargaining in many countries and reduced 
  Handbook of research on employee 
voice 29 
 
the capacity of unions to pursue distributional goals. They also suggest that these trends are 
not inevitable, but influenced by policy and politics: governments, unions, and other groups in 
civil society can develop new strategies aimed at redressing power imbalances and extending 
these institutions to poorly represented industry segments and employee groups. 
Future research on structures of and outcomes from collective bargaining should seek 
to integrate these perspectives. One broad research question concerns how collective voice 
institutions can be maintained or strengthened under conditions in which companies are able 
to restructure production across national borders and make wide use of subcontractors and 
atypical contracts. Studies should combine comparisons of legal and institutional bargaining 
structures with analyses of strategies that allow workers to negotiate and enforce agreements. 
As production structures and workforce composition change, the form and the content of 
workers’ collective responses are transforming as well. Actors are developing new policies and 
strategies aimed at rebuilding bargaining power in production networks within and across 
national borders. These measures involve standard-setting and policymaking by international 
organizations and governments, but also consumer boycotts and worker mobilization through 
unions and other civil society actors. These innovative strategies often operate outside 
traditional collective bargaining institutions. More research is required to understand their 
impact on the balance of power within organizations and societies. 
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NOTES 
1. According to the ILO, Belarus, Cambodia, Colombia, Eritrea, Myanmar, and the Philippines 
have among the worst records of regular government obstruction of collective bargaining (ILO 
2008). 
2. According to Visser (2011), only three OECD countries, Belgium, Germany, and Ireland, were 
characterized by national or central bargaining in 2010, complemented by sectoral and local or 
company bargaining. Other continental European countries, together with Australia and Israel, 
had predominantly sectoral bargaining; while local or company bargaining was dominant in the 
Anglo-American countries, several central and eastern European countries (Slovakia, Poland, 
and Estonia), and the Asian and Latin American countries, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Chile. 
However, these broad categories show considerable diversity: for example, ‘centralized’ 
bargaining in Ireland was based on tripartite social partnership agreements, which collapsed in 
2010. 
3. Among OECD countries, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden have the 
strongest legal rights to board-level representation; while the Anglo-American countries, Japan, 
South Korea, and Switzerland have no rights (Jackson 2005). 
4. Friedman (1962: 123-A) observed along more general lines that ‘Unions have . . . not only 
harmed the public at large and workers as a whole by distorting the use of labor; they have also 
made the incomes of the working class more unequal by reducing the opportunities available to 
the most disadvantaged workers.’ 
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5. There have been a range of other typologies describing ‘national models’ of capitalism, 
including, for example, the national business systems approach (Whitley 1999), the theory of 
employment systems (Marsden 1999), and the social systems of production literature 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997).   
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